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ABSTRACT
Objective To evaluate a national programme to develop
and implement centrally stored electronic summaries of
patients’ medical records.
DesignMixed-method, multilevel case study.
Setting English National Health Service 2007-10. The
summary care record (SCR) was introduced as part of the
National Programme for Information Technology. This
evaluation of the SCR considered it in the context of
national policy and its frontline implementation and use
in three districts.
Participants and methods Quantitative data (cumulative
records created nationally plus a dataset of 416325
encounters in participating primary care out-of-hours and
walk-in centres) were analysed statistically. Qualitative
data (140 interviews including policy makers, managers,
clinicians, and software suppliers; 2000 pages of
ethnographic field notes including observation of 214
clinical consultations; and 3000 pages of documents)
were analysed thematically and interpretively.
Results Creating individual SCRs and supporting their
adoption and usewas a complex, technically challenging,
and labour intensive process that occurred more slowly
than planned. By early 2010, 1.5million such records had
been created. In participating primary care out-of-hours
and walk-in centres, an SCR was accessed in 4% of all
encounters and in 21% of encounters where one was
available; these figures were rising in some but not all
sites. The main determinant of SCR access was the
identity of the clinician: individual clinicians accessed
available SCRs between 0 and 84% of the time. When
accessed, an SCR seemed to support better quality care
and increase clinician confidence in some encounters.
There was no direct evidence of improved safety, but
findings were consistent with a rare but important
positive impact on preventing medication errors. SCRs
sometimes contained incomplete or inaccurate data, but
clinicians drew judiciously on these data along with other
sources. SCR use was not associated with shorter
consultations or reduction in onward referral. Successful
introduction of SCRs depended on interaction between
multiple stakeholders from different worlds (clinical,
political, technical, commercial) with different values,
priorities, andways of working. The programme’s fortunes
seemed to turn on the ability of change agents to bridge
these different institutional worlds, align their conflicting
logics, and mobilise implementation effort.
Conclusions Benefits of centrally stored electronic
summary records seem more subtle and contingent than
many stakeholders anticipated, and clinicians may not
access them. Complex interdependencies, inherent
tensions, and high implementation workload should be
expected when they are introduced on a national scale.
INTRODUCTION
Shared electronic records are being introduced in
some countries for exchange of various types of data
including medication, allergies, medical history,
laboratory reports, referral letters, and discharge sum-
maries (see Discussion). This paper considers the sum-
mary care record (SCR), a structured summary held on
a national database and accessible to authorised staff
over a secure internet connection, in the English
National Health Service.
The National Programme for Information Technol-
ogy in England was established in 2005 and led by
Connecting for Health, the informatics arm of the
Department of Health.1 It aimed to provide secure,
nationally integrated electronic records as part of a
wider political vision. In its 13 year administration
(1997-2010), the UK Labour government pursued
policies aimed at modernising public services (increas-
ing efficiency, accountability, transparency, and orien-
tation to the needs of the service user).2 3 Large scale
information systems, which would integrate services
and support choice by empowered citizens, were
viewed as a key vehicle for achieving this goal.4-6 A
series of policy documents in 1998-2008 sought to cen-
tralise control over specification, procurement,
resource management, and delivery of information
systems.1 7-12 The original vision included a central
technical infrastructure known as the “Spine” and a
nationally shared electronic record7; in early strategy
documents the latter became a nationally stored sum-
mary record.13
Implementation of the SCR began in 2007 in two
early adopter sites; a national roll-out began in mid
2008. By May 2010, 113 of 152 primary care trusts in
England had committed to participating in the pro-
gramme; 16 had begun to create SCRs; 29.8 million
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people (73%of thepopulation aged>16 ) hadbeen sent
a letter informing them that an SCR would be created
for them if they did not opt out; and 1.5 million such
records had been created.
An SCR is currently drawn from the electronic
record held by a person’s general practitioner; it con-
tains three data fields—medication, allergies, and
adverse reactions.14 It is intended for use in emergency
and unscheduled care.15 Individuals may register to
view their record via an internet-accessible personal
health organiser (HealthSpace). Some general prac-
tices have begun to “enrich” their patients’ records
with additional data fields such as important diagnoses
and end-of-life care preferences. A forthcoming
upgrade will allow secondary and community care
staff to add data.
We reported previously on initial efforts to intro-
duce SCRs in early adopter sites16 and on patients’ atti-
tudes to SCRs.17 This paper, based on a longer report,14
addresses efforts to extend the programme nationally
from 2008 to 2010. Research questions were
What is the usability, use, functionality, and impact
of the SCR, and what explains variation in its
adoption and use?
How have the fortunes of the SCR programme been
shaped and constrained by influences at the macro,
meso, and micro level?
What are the transferable lessons for practice and
policy?
METHODS
Management and governance
The evaluation was commissioned by the Department
of Health through a competitive tendering process run
by the Connecting for Health Evaluation Programme
at theUniversity of Birmingham. It was overseen by an
external advisory group chaired by a layperson with
representation from key stakeholders including
patients, professional bodies, academic institutions,
and Connecting for Health. Ethical approval was
obtained from twomulticentre research ethics commit-
tees—Thames Valley in January 2007 (06/MRE12/81
and subsequent amendments) and North West 8 in
September 2009 (09/H1013/36 and subsequent
amendments)—although these bodies classified some
aspects of the study as “audit” and hence outside their
remit.
Theoretical approach
We drew on Patton’s “utilisation-focused evaluation,”
which views complex programmes as having multiple
stakeholders, each with different expectations of the
programme and the evaluation.18 We followed Klein
and Myers’ method for interpretive field studies in
large scale information systems, which emphasises
continuous, iterative comparison of findings in one
part of the project with an emerging overarching
story of the whole.19 We refined these generic
approaches into a specific method described in detail
elsewhere.20 In short, we made four key assumptions:
Electronic records are not passive containers for
information but actively shape and constrain care
People and technologies are linked in complex,
dynamic socio-technical networks which offer
possibilities and limit what is possible (materially
and socially) in particular situations and contexts.
Hence it is more useful to study “the process of
socio-technical change” than “deployment of
technology X”
People and technologies in a network both “act” but
not in the same way (for example, people have
values and feelings whereas technologies do not)
A technology programme should be studied at
macro level (such as national policy, wider social
norms and expectations), meso level (such as
organisational processes and routines), and micro
level (such as particular experiences of patients and
professionals) and both qualitatively and
quantitatively to build a rich, contextualised picture
of complex change (fig 1).
Qualitative data
Qualitative data were collected with a view to answer-
ing the following questions:
How was the SCR framed (that is, what did its
development and introduction seem to mean) in
policies, strategies, and business plans; by service
users and health professionals; and by critical voices
such as the press and civil liberties activists? What
hopes and concerns did different stakeholders have
about it?
What were the social and technical challenges
associated with efforts to create SCRs? How and to
what extent were these overcome?
Once SCRs had been created, how were they
accessed and used at the clinical front line? If they
were not accessed and used, why not?
Macro level
National and regional
  policies and priorities
Economic climate
Technological developments
Social movements
Professional norms and
  standards
Meso level (such as
  organisation)
Job descriptions, training,
  work routines
IT systems and in-house
  knowledge
Culture and support for
  innovation or risk taking
Micro level (such as clinical encounter)
People’s identities, roles, knowledge, skills
What technology can and can’t do in a
  particular situation and setting
Fig 1 | Diagrammatic representation of the socio-technical network in the summary care record
programme, showing multiple levels of influence and analysis
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Qualitative data sources and their contribution to
different components of the case study are shown in
web extra table A. As is recommended practice in
large scale organisational case studies,21 22 we drew on
multiple data sources of different types, including over
140 interviews; 2000 pages of field notes reflecting
approximately 1500 hours of ethnographic observa-
tion (incorporating detailed field notes on 214 clinical
encounters); 3000 pages of documents such as policies,
business plans, minutes, internal reports, communica-
tions, and media coverage; and feedback from stake-
holders to drafts of our findings. Details of how this
large and complex dataset was analysed are given in
our full report.14 In sum, to analyse interviews and
field notes, we read and annotated texts, discussed
among team members, developed provisional expla-
nations, and iteratively refined these using the constant
comparative method.23 Rigour was defined in terms of
authenticity (immersion in the case through extended
fieldwork), plausibility (developing explanations of
local phenomena which made sense to participants
and drawing these together into a coherent overall nar-
rative), and criticality (systematically questioning
assumptions that are taken for granted).24 25 To analyse
documents, we drew on the principles of critical dis-
course analysis.26
Quantitative data
Quantitative datawere collectedwith a view to answer-
ing the following questions:
What proportion of patients seen in emergency and
unscheduled care had an SCR; in what proportion
of these was it accessed; and what was the trend
over time?
How did SCR availability and access vary in
different sites and settings?
How did SCR access vary with patient
characteristics (such as age, sex, nature of
complaint) and clinician characteristics (such as
doctor or nurse, level of experience)?
Was the SCR associated with a change in
consultation length (for example, was there any
evidence that its use made the consultation shorter)?
Quantitative data were collected by stakeholders in
the programme and passed to us in either summary or
raw form. Connecting for Health gave us cumulative
summary statistics, updated weekly, on numbers of
SCRs created, which were collated from weekly
reports sent to them by participating regional centres.
These indicated the national rate of record creation but
were not amenable to further analysis. Adastra (a soft-
ware companywhich suppliesmedical record software
to unscheduled care organisations) passed us Excel
files containing raw data on 416 325 consultations (on
325 321 episodes) in primary care out-of-hours and
walk-in centres in the three sites in our sample between
August 2008 and January 2010. Patient identifiers had
been removed and clinician identifiers pseudony-
mised. Sites A and B were early adopters and had
begun to create SCRs in late 2007. Site C joined the
programme as part of the national roll-out and began
to create SCRs in August 2009. Each entry gave a clin-
ician identifier, diagnostic code(s) entered by the clin-
ician, length of consultation to the nearest minute,
whether an SCR was available, and whether it was
accessed. Around a quarter of patients had had consul-
tations with more than one clinician for the same epi-
sode (such as telephone consultation with a nurse
followed by on site consultation with a doctor).
Analysis of this dataset is described in detail in the
web extra appendix. Most analyses were done on a
subset of 223 029 episodes (120 659 in site A, 102 370
in site B, and 65 588 in site C), representing timeswhen
SCRs were available in the three sites. Briefly, we con-
ducted descriptive statistical tests (such as percen-
tages); χ2 test for categorical variables; Pearson’s
correlation coefficients for relationships over time;
Mann-Whitney tests for skewed continuous variables;
and logistic regression to explore the contribution of
different variables to an overall model of factors that
influenced SCR access. Analyses were undertaken for
each site separately and all sites combined, and also for
doctors and nurses separately and all clinicians com-
bined. We used narrative synthesis to integrate quali-
tative and quantitative data.
RESULTS
What stakeholders expected of the summary care record
The SCR programme had multiple stakeholders (gov-
ernment and civil service, healthcare organisations,
information technology (IT) suppliers, professional
bodies, frontline clinicians and managers, service
users, civil liberties groups). Policy makers anticipated
six main benefits—better quality (such as more
informed) care, safer care (such as reduction inmedica-
tion errors), more efficient care (such as shorter consul-
tations), more equitable care (such as in low-literacy
patients or limited English speakers), reduction in
onward referral (such as fewer hospital admissions),
and improved patient satisfaction (because more
needs would be met).27-30 In contrast, some critics
framed the programme as a monolithic, inefficient,
and delayed government IT project, and civil liberties
campaigners saw it as a manifestation of the “Database
State.”31 Patient organisations generally viewed the
SCRpositively as offering better and safer care, though
they recognised a trade-off against the risk to privacy.
Implementing the programme
Creating SCRs and supporting clinicians to access
them in unscheduled care involved numerous inter-
dependent tasks (box 1) and occurred more slowly
than originally planned. Local healthcare organisa-
tions were encouraged to maximise creation of SCRs,
promote their use in a range of settings, document
locally relevant benefits, and report back regularly to
Connecting for Health on structured templates.
National implementation managers and clinical leads
were appointed to support this process. But in the face
of finite budgets, competing policy priorities, and ethi-
cal concerns being voiced by local and national
RESEARCH
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professional bodies, one NHS organisation (such as a
primary care trust) had limited power to control and
monitor the performance of another (such as a general
practice) in “deploying” the SCR.
The date on which a general practice first uploaded
patient data to create SCRs was known as the “go-live.”
The challenges of engaging clinicians, finding
resources, aligning business processes, training staff,
and informing patients, along with delays in provision
of technical solutions, combined to produce slippage in
go-live dates and a concomitant loss of localmorale and
motivation. “Bugs” sometimes emerged when go-lives
were attempted, necessitating manual workarounds for
what was intended to be an automated upload.
Suppliers of electronic patient record software to gen-
eral practices worked to develop upgrades that were
compliant with the SCR and fix bugs that emerged dur-
ing uploads.However,most of their customerswerenot
asking for functionality to create SCRs, so thisworkwas
seen by some as diverting resources from the com-
pany’s core business of improving “in hours” general
practice record systems. In contrast, Adastra, the main
provider of software to primary care out-of-hours orga-
nisations, perceived strong demand from its customers
for viewing shared records, so a one-click route to the
SCRwas a high priority development. Small size, com-
peting business priorities, changes in specification, and
the inherently unpredictable nature of software devel-
opment limited the ability of some suppliers to deliver
SCR functionality within the tight timeframes set out in
the business plans of Connecting for Health and NHS
organisations.
SCRs were hosted on the NHS Spine, provided
under contract by a large commercial supplier, British
Telecommunications (BT). Some staff employed by
BT felt that the original specification had been set in
board-level meetings with insufficient attention paid
to the detail of frontline clinical work and perceived
the contract as inflexible, though this was not the
view of topmanagement. Amendments to the contract
were needed to incorporate changes to the specifica-
tion that had not been fully anticipated at the outset
of the programme.
Before patients’ SCRswere created, theywere sent a
letter explaining the programme and telling them how
to opt out if they wished. Fewer than 1% of people
opted out, but for various reasons (alleged lack of bal-
ance in information provided, letters discarded unread
or not understood, confusing opt-out process) the
extent to which “informed consent to upload” had
been obtained was contested.32 In late 2008, the con-
sent model changed to require clinicians to seek con-
sent at the point of care. Support from some
professional bodies for the programme increased
after this change. However, concerns were by no
means fully allayed, and the British Medical Associa-
tion wrote to the minister of health in March 2010
expressing concern that a mass public mailout before
the May 2010 general election was giving patients
insufficient time to consider their options.33
Accurate and reliable SCRs depended on data qual-
ity of the local records from which they were created.
In 2007-9, a national incentive scheme funded work in
general practices to achieve data quality targets (which
were initially a requirement for joining the SCR pro-
gramme), but funding for thiswas not renewed in 2009.
Some but not all primary care trusts allocated a budget
for a local data quality scheme.
Unauthorised access through technical (“hacking”)
or human (malice or error) breaches is an inherent
risk of any nationally accessible record. For the SCR,
this risk came with political sensitivities.31 Connecting
for Health required the highest technical security stan-
dards and lengthy penetration testing before approv-
ing a product. Staff wishing to access a patient’s SCR
were required to confirm a “legitimate relationship.”
Detailed information governance procedures were
Box 1: Tasks in implementing the summary care record programme
Strategy and business planning (needed at national, regional, and local level)
Clarifying vision and setting goals
Estimating costs and timescales
Negotiating and allocating a budget
Aligning with other strategic priorities
Formalising relationships (contracts, service level agreements, memoranda of
understanding)
Identifying risks
Project management (needed at national, regional, and local level)
Establishing workstreams with targets and milestones
Developing business processes
Engaging stakeholders
Selecting, coordinating, and supporting participant organisations
Human resource issues (recruiting, training, supervising, performance managing)
Monitoring and reporting (including risk management)
Technology development (IT suppliers plus technical departments in participant
organisations)
Understanding use cases and specifying what is needed from the IT
Developing software
Testing (including security)
Release
Post-release support (such as fixing bugs)
Rhetorical and communicative tasks
Framing and making sense of the programme
Justifying the programme (ethically, financially, politically) to key interest groups
Informing the public and managing queries and opt outs
Dealing with ongoing tensions
Redefining scope and content to reflect ideas for new uses
Operationalising “informed consent” when staff were busy and patients disinterested or
confused
Making security and information governance processes workable (technical and human
elements)
Balancing the need for high quality data with the goal of maximising number of records
available
Balancing children’s autonomy and protection with parents’ wish to opt out on a child’s
behalf
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introduced to monitor performance and generate
“alerts” on possible unauthorised accesses. While
some staff sympathised with these measures, others
found them bureaucratic, intrusive, and unworkable.
Fear of surveillance stopped some staff attempting to
access SCRs altogether.
Use and non-use of summary care records: quantitative
findings
Key quantitative findings are listed below; these raise
qualitative questions which are addressed in the next
section. Unless stated otherwise, the figures given
below are derived from the Adastra dataset, detailed
statistical analysis of which is presented in the appendix
(see bmj.com). Some analyses focused on site B, chosen
as showing the longest consistent use of the SCR.
What proportion of patients had a summary care record?
The proportion of patients seen in unscheduled pri-
mary care settings (out of hours centres and walk-in
centres) who had an SCR increased from 19% to 31%
in site A, 18% to 35% in site B between August 2008
and January 2010, and from 0% to 24% in site C
between August 2009 and January 2010. This figure
was known as the “hit rate” (that is, the chance of a
clinician finding an SCR if he or she chose to look for
one). Given that fewer than 1% of people in each site
had opted out, themain determinant of the hit rate was
whether the patient’s general practitioner was partici-
pating in the programme. Despite primary care trusts
in sites A and B signing up as “early adopters” of the
programme in 2007, 56% of general practices in site A
and 24% in site B had not gone live with SCRs by early
2010. Hit rate was reduced by patients attending
unscheduled care “out of area.”
In what proportion of patients was the summary care
record accessed?
SCR accesses in secondary care settings were very low
(fewer than30 perweek across the three sites,Connect-
ing for Health data). Overall, in participating primary
care out-of-hours and walk-in centres, an SCR was
accessed in 4% of all encounters and in 21% of encoun-
ters where one was available. Trends in SCR accesses
in primary care settings over time, expressed as a pro-
portion of all patients seen, are shown in fig 2. The
three sites show different patterns: early adoption fol-
lowed by a period of partial abandonment (site A);
slow incremental adoption (site B); and more rapid
adoption after a late start (site C). Statistical analysis
of these trends is presented in the web appendix.
How did summary care record access vary with clinician
characteristics?
Themost significant single factor predicting SCRaccess
was the identity of the clinician seeing the patient,which
accounted for approximately15%of total variance (data
from site B, logistic regression, χ2(103)=3591,
P<0.0001). Individual clinicians accessed available
SCRs between 0 and 84% of the time (fig 3). Clinicians
who saw more patients in unscheduled care accessed
SCRs significantly more often than average (data from
site B, χ2(1)=470.9, P<0.0001).Overall, doctors were no
moreor less likely thannurses toaccessSCRs (χ2(1)=0.2,
P=0.7; χ2(1)=2.3, P=0.13; χ2(1)=1.8, P=0.19 respectively
in sites A, B, and C).
How did summary care record access vary with patient
characteristics?
We found small absolute differences in access rates by
the sex and age of patients, which reached statistical
significance because the dataset was large. A multiple
regression model incorporating site (A, B, or C), age,
sex, date, day of week, and time of day (see web appen-
dix) was statistically highly significant but accounted
for only a small fraction of the variance in SCR access
(pseudo R2=3.6%).
Analysis by diagnostic code was limited by marked
inconsistency in coding practices between sites and
between clinicians within sites. With that caveat, we
found some evidence that the SCR was more likely to
be accessed in conditions such as urinary tract infection
for which information on current or recent drugs and
allergies was likely to be useful (logistic regression
χ2(1)=45.1, P<0.0001) and when the patient had more
than one coded diagnosis (χ2(1)=78.7, P<0.0001). How-
ever, variation by diagnostic code was much less
marked than variation between clinicians. In short, as
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Fig 2 | Proportion of consultations in which patients’ summary
care records (SCRs) were accessed in the three participating
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fig 3 shows,manyclinicians did not access SCRs regard-
less of the presenting problem.
Was summary care record use associated with change in
consultation length?
Overall, consultations in which the SCR was accessed
were significantly longer than consultations in which it
was not accessed (median 10 minutes v 9 minutes,
Mann-Whitney test, z=−6.4, P<0.0001). This differ-
ence was more marked for nurse consultations
(15 minutes v 12 minutes, z=−7.5, P<0.0001). How-
ever, subanalyses by site and type of clinician (see
web appendix) showed that this relationship was not
consistent either between sites or by clinician type.Dif-
ferences may be attributable to confounding variables
(see below).
Use and non-use of summary care records: qualitative
findings
Explaining low hit rate
Some clinicians working in unscheduled care settings
said they rarely looked for SCRs because there was
only a small chance of finding one given that many
local general practices had not yet gone live. Reasons
why a practice had not gone live varied considerably
between sites.Anumber of general practice record sys-
tems were not compliant with SCRs; practices using
these systems (covering 20% of the population nation-
ally at the time of the study) would be unable to parti-
cipate in the programme without replacing in-house
software. Other reasons included inadequate data
quality, inadequate technical infrastructure (such as
the need to install a more powerful server), opposition
to the programme, and competing priorities.
Different potential barriers had a greater or lesser
impact in different sites. In site A, for example, the
local medical committee included opinion leaders
who opposed the SCR programme and a number of
practices had yet to meet locally set data quality stan-
dards. The rapid rate of SCRcreation in siteC appeared
to be attributable to a combination of factors predicted
previously16: national and local policy goals were
aligned, improving out-of-hours serviceswas an explicit
strategic priority, top management strongly supported
the programme, middle managers were enthusiastic,
local clinical engagement was strong (including com-
mitment to data quality work), opponents to the pro-
gramme were few and did not occupy powerful
positions, and participating organisations had favour-
able technical capacity (for example, almost all general
practice record systems were SCR compliant).
Explaining non-access of summary care records
Analysis of ethnographic data on 214 clinical consulta-
tions showed that non-access of the SCR had many
different reasons, including not being clinically indi-
cated; not technically possible (for example, the orga-
nisation was temporarily unable to access the Spine);
clinician not trained or motivated (including “forgot-
ten” smart card or password); delays in supplying
working smart cards (such as to short term staff); and
the organisation “not pushing” SCR use, usually
Table 1 | Reasons for non-use of patients’ summary care records (SCRs) from 214 directly observed clinical encounters
Reason Example
Data fieldsofferedbySCRwere irrelevant to the
encounter
Patient had a minor illness or no illness
Patient sought something other than a clinical decision (such as certification)
Data fields offered by SCR were reliably
provided by some other source
Patient or carer knew full details of medication and allergies
Patient or carer brought medication
Ambulance staff brought patient’s medication
GP referral letter included a full medical history
Patient did not have SCR Patient was not registered with a GP
Patient was registered with a GP whose practice used non-SCR compliant software
Patient was registered with a GP whose practice had not yet gone live with the SCR programme
Patient was registered with a GP whose practice was ethically opposed to the SCR programme
Patient had opted out of having an SCR
A third party (parent) had opted out of SCR on behalf of the patient
Technical connection to Spine was not
possible
Spine connection was temporarily lost in provider organisation
Clinician had no access to a computer terminal
Computer terminal had no smart card reader hence no Spine access
Patient’s SCR was not found or did not contain
any data
Receptionist failed to find patient record on Spine (for example, surname or date of birth incorrect on Spine or entered wrongly into search field)
SCR showedmessage “This record is blank”
SCR use was incompatible with organisational
routines and practices
Organisation was “not pushing” SCR use (such as no local champion, higher priority being given to other IT projects such as shared local
records)
Training happened many months earlier, staff had moved on or forgotten how to access SCRs
Information governance controls were seen as unworkable (such as in busy A&E departments where computer terminals were shared)
Clinician lacked capacity or privileges to
access SCRs
Clinician had not been trained
Clinician had not been issued with a smart card
Clinician’s smart card did not work
Clinician had lost smart card or was not carrying it
Clinician had forgotten password
Clinician lacked motivation to access SCRs Clinician did not anticipate that SCRs would provide useful information
Clinician did not trust data quality on SCRs
Clinician was concerned about information governance controls (that is, fear of triggering an access alert)
GP=general practitioner. IT=information technology. A&E=accident and emergency
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because of a perception, correct or otherwise, that the
hit rate would be low (table 1). In secondary care set-
tings, non-adoptionwas further explained by lack of an
integrated technical solution (that is, the clinician had
to exit one piece of software and go into another to
access an SCR) and by the temporal and spatial chal-
lenges of accessing computer terminals in real time (see
examples in box 2).
The partial abandonment of SCRs in siteA (see fig 2)
may have been partly due to a change of premises, dur-
ing which some staff temporarily lost access privileges
so that their smart cards ceased to work. Temporary
reduction in access rate was also seen during periods
when the proportion of locums and inexperienced staff
was higher (such as Christmas and August).
Benefits associated with summary care record use
We observed clinical consultations in which the SCR
seemed to add value, especially when patients had
been prescribedmultiplemedications andwere unsure
what these were (table 2). We observed no cases in
which an SCR unequivocally made care safer, or in
which absence of one seemed to make care unsafe.
This seemed to be because doctors, nurses, and
pharmacists tended to err on the side of caution and
took additional safety measures if key data were not
available. However, because the incidence of harm
from medication errors appears to be low in relation
to the number of prescriptions issued in the primary
care setting34 and the SCR was little used in any other
setting, our findings do not exclude a significant posi-
tive impact on patient safety. When dealing with com-
plex cases, clinicians sometimes found it stressful and
challenging tomakedecisions in the absenceof reliable
data on medication and allergies and described the
SCR as making such consultations “easier” even
when it did not change management.
We encountered no examples of SCR use influen-
cing onward referral (for example, preventing a hospi-
tal admission or ambulance call), nor of a patient
without an SCR whose onward referral decision was
likely to have been different had one been present.
We found it impossible to assess whether patients
were more satisfied when their SCR was accessed,
because satisfaction was a function of the consultation
as a whole, not of the presence or absence of a particu-
lar technology.
Risks associated with summary care record use
We encountered examples of incomplete and inaccu-
rate data on the SCR (table 2).However,wedid not see
any cases where this led to harm or risk of harm to the
patient—precisely because clinicians did not view the
SCR as the sole source of reliable data. Rather, they
drew eclectically on multiple sources, including the
patient, electronic and paper records, and their own
observations and measurements. When these sources
conflicted, theymade a contextualised judgment about
which data source was most trustworthy and the level
of residual uncertainty in the case.
Explaining longer consultations with the summary care
record
One possible confounding variable explaining this
unexpected finding is that the SCR was more likely to
be accessed for complex illnesses or when the patient
had more than one complaint. Our qualitative data
also showed that when information held on the SCR
was poorly matched with the scope of practice of the
clinician (such as a long medication list viewed by a
nurse without senior level prescribing training), its use
sometimes led to a time consuming attempt to make
sense of the information viewed by consulting a formu-
lary, asking a colleague, or questioning the patient.
The socio-technical network
The SCR programme can be conceptualised as a com-
plex, dynamic, and unstable socio-technical network
with multiple interacting sub-networks (fig 1 and box 3).
Individuals and organisations in the network represented
four different institutional “worlds”—political, clinical,
technical, and commercial.35 The personal world of the
patient formed a fifth perspective. In the political world,
the programmes were an exercise in modernising the
NHS by improving efficiency in the public sector and
Box 2: Examples of how small details made a big difference to actions and outcomes
Case FN22/#01—A hospital pharmacist is doing her rounds on an intermediate ward of
newly admitted patients. This patient is a limited English speaker who seems confused. He
has a plastic carrier bag by his bed containing some bottles of medication. The pharmacist
asks if she may access his SCR, and the patient consents. However, the pharmacist
decides not to do so, since the patient may not have understood the question and in this
hospital an internal rule has been introduced that only doctors may use the emergency
override option (“best interests of patient”).
Although the pharmacist undoubtedly had a legitimate relationship with this patient, a
number of key nuances combined to produce “non-access” of the SCR: both the need
for further information and the patient’s consent were equivocal, and the pharmacist
was bound by local as well as national access constraints.
Case FN04/#42—A senior doctor in a busy accident and emergency department seeks to
access the SCR of a patient who is bleeding. He finds one of three terminals (shared by
about 20 clinicians) and asks the junior doctor who is using it to hurry up. Within seconds
he has inserted his own smart card and is logging on. When he finds the patient’s record,
he remembers he has not asked the patient’s consent but quickly selects “best interests of
patient” on the grounds that the information he seeks (about anticoagulant medication)
could be life saving.
Had this doctor not been confident to use the emergency override, he would have had
to make a long journey back to the patient to ask consent (and lose his place in the
queue for the terminal). The combination of seniority, confidence, technical skill, and a
clear clinical need for the information combined to produce “access” rather than “non-
access” in this case—although disappointingly the patient’s record did not contain the
information he sought.
Case FN06/#68—A nurse in awalk-in centre sees a patient with a headache. The nurse has
her own consulting room. She has already logged on to the computer terminal with her
smart card at the start of the session. The patient is not sure of her medication, and the
nurse asks, “Do youmind if I look up your GP record?” The patient replies, “Please yourself,”
and the medication list is quickly found.
In this case, the physical and technical infrastructure of the walk-in centre (every
clinician has a terminal) along with key characteristics of the clinician (experienced,
trained, in possession of a working smart card) and the patient (fully conscious, not
seriously unwell, confident in the clinician) combined to produce rapid, one-click
access to the patient’s SCR.
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deliveringmeasurablebenefits topatients and taxpayers.2
In the clinical world, they were an initiative to improve
quality of care in an area (unscheduled care) where con-
cerns had been raised about standards.28 In the technical
world, they were a software development project for use
in cases characterised by unpredictability and a high
degree of exceptionality. In the commercial world,
many IT companies viewed them as high risk but poten-
tially high revenue business contracts. In the personal
world, the SCR was a potential encroachment (for good
or ill) of the system into the patient’s lifeworld.36
Differences in norms, values, priorities, expecta-
tions, and ways of working between these five worlds,
and imperfect attempts to bridge these differences,
accounted for much of the instability in the socio-tech-
nical network, and this in turn explained many of the
challenges and frictions encountered as the collabora-
tive tasks of design, implementation, governance,
frontline use, and evaluation (box 3) were pursued.
Change agents who proved most pivotal in the pro-
gramme held boundary roles between different orga-
nisations and sectors and managed to align—to some
extent at least—the complex and competing institu-
tional logics that characterised the network. They
achieved this by engaging actively in what has been
called “translation,”37 which involves four stages—pro-
blem construction (defining a problem for which the
SCR offered a solution), selling the idea (getting others
to accept this problem-solution link), enrolment (defin-
ing key roles and practices in the socio-technical net-
work), and mobilisation (engaging people in fulfilling
the roles, undertaking the practices, and linking with
others in the network).
The PRINCE 2 approach to project management
(www.prince2.com/) adopted by Connecting for
Health, strategic health authorities, and some primary
care trusts—in which explicit goals and milestones are
systematically defined, pursued, and signed off—
appeared to be an efficient business tool for managing
the parts of the programme that could be controlled,
isolated into discrete work packages, and “managed”
in the conventional sense of the word. But it seemed
that the sheer complexity of the socio-technical net-
work and its embeddedness inwider institutional struc-
tures, some heavily contested, limited the impact of
this change model in critical parts of the programme.
At the micro level, frontline staff from different
“worlds” brought different beliefs, values, motives,
and meaning-systems to their organisational roles
(“normative” influences). Their actions were also
shaped and constrained by such things as job descrip-
tions, access privileges, and the functionality and lim-
itations of technologies (“causal” influences).
Relatively small differences in normative and causal
Table 2 | Examples of benefits and risks of patients’ summary care records (SCRs) from a qualitative dataset of 214 directly observed clinical encounters
Benefit or risk of SCR Specific examples
SCR seemed to support better quality care or increase clinician’s confidence
Patient was unsure of medication, allergies, or
adverse reactions
FN03/#24—Patient with urinary symptoms had had four courses of antibiotics in previous 6 weeks. SCR was available and listed which
antibiotics had been given and when
FN04/01—Patient was unaware of adverse reaction to statin listed on SCR
Patient was unable to communicate fully FN01/#05—Elderly patient newly admitted to hospital, spoke no English, and was confused. SCR provided current medication list which
informed management decision
SCR data alerted clinician to wider aspects of
the case
FN29/#204—50 year old patient telephoned out-of-hours centre for what seemed to be a trivial request. Nurse viewed SCR and saw 12
current medications, some associated with serious illnesses, and was thus alerted that patient was sick, hence prioritised calling them back
SCR was unavailable but key data may have been provided had it been present
Patient’s account was possibly untrustworthy FN05/#55—Patient asked out-of-hours GP for sleeping tablets and claimed to be taking these regularly
Patient was unsure of medication FN03/#35—Patient with dizziness thought she was taking “manoxady,” perhaps meaning minoxidil
FN03/#50—Relative of patient with chest pain telephoned out-of-hours GP and talked of “a spray, God knows what’s in it.” GP could not
ascertain whether this was for asthma or angina
FN05/#59—Patient with glaucoma consulted out-of-hours GP because he had run out of eye drops. He knew the drug name but not the
strength, for which there were three possibilities
Patient was unable to communicate fully FN13/#126—Patient was brought into A&E department unconscious and unaccompanied, no other source of medication or allergies
SCR seemed to be unhelpful or misleading
SCR did not list patient’s current medication Medication being taken but not listed on patient’s SCR had been obtained from:
High street pharmacy (FN05/#64—Eye drops, but patient unsure which ones)
GP out-of-hours or walk-in centre (FN29/#201—Penicillin given to toddler)
Hospital outpatient clinic (FN07/#97—Triple therapy for helicobacter issued the day before)
Stockpiled supply of old medication (FN29/#206—Parent gave antibiotic to infant from old supply in fridge)
Relative’s supply of drugs (FN12/#112—Suspected overdose of partner’s tablets)
Abroad (FN16/#154—Opioid analgesics bought over the counter)
SCR listed “current medication” which patient
was not taking
FN29/#212—Eye drops had been stopped but still appeared as a current drug because they had not been actively moved to “past drugs”
FN56/#05—Asthma inhaler listed as “current,” but patient had not picked up prescription
Patient’s allergies or adverse reactions not
listed on SCR
FN29/#210—Older patient with cystitis symptoms. SCR listed no allergies or adverse reactions, but patient was sure she was allergic to
“something beginning with ‘amp’” and, on prompting, thought this was ampicillin
SCR listed allergies or adverse reactions which
the patient may not have had
FN06/#65—SCR of patient born in 1932 listed adverse reaction to penicillin. Patient described being “ill for quite a while” after penicillin as
a small child. Penicillin was not widely used in UK until 1947 and adverse reactions to it tend to be short term, so this was more likely to
have been a reaction to sulphonamide which had been incorrectly coded as penicillin allergy on the GP record and this error subsequently
transferred to the SCR
GP=general practitioner. IT=information technology
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influences on individuals sometimes explained wide
variations in actions and outcomes (see examples in
box 2). Inbuilt in the SCR were assumptions about
individual behaviour and the culture and work prac-
tices of NHS organisations—for example, that fear of
surveillance would not deter staff from accessing them
and that general practice staff would enter key data in
coded fields on the local records fromwhich they were
created. Mismatches between these inscribed assump-
tions and the reality of clinical work explainedmuch of
the non-adoption, partial adoption, and abandonment
of these technologies at the level of the individual user.
DISCUSSION
This evaluationhas shown that someprogress has been
made in introducing shared electronic summary
records in England and that some benefits have
occurred. However, significant social and technical
barriers to the widespread adoption and use of such
records remain, and their benefits to date appear
more subtle and contingent than early policy docu-
ments predicted.
The largest single factor explaining non-use of the
SCR at the clinical frontlinewas the identity of the clin-
ician. As previous researchers have found, “most CIS
[computerised information systems] implementations
fail because, despite high investments in terms of both
time and financial resources, physicians simply do not
use them.”38 The finding that many out-of-hours clin-
icians do not access SCRs even when these are avail-
able with “one-click” access suggests that potential
safety benefits (such as in preventing medication
errors) may fail to accrue. Coiera has argued that
e-health initiatives may focus too much on electronic
records and too little on associated functionality such
as automated alerts, though the extent to which this
potential solution would overcome the problem of
non-adoption by clinicians in practice is speculative.39
A key strength of this study was the use of a new
theoretical and methodological approach, derived
from a systematic literature review of electronic record
research that deliberately went beyond the biomedical
literature and embraced sociology, computer sup-
ported cooperative work, and empirical philosophy.40
This enabled us to combine qualitative and quantita-
tive techniques to highlight the competing conceptua-
lisations and complex interdependencies of the SCR
programme and to bring into frame numerous social,
technical, ethical, and political explanations for why
particular goals and milestones set by policy makers
and implementation teams were or were not reached.
The main limitation of the study is perhaps the
extent to which this approach will be viewed as valid
by the e-health community. Our analysis of the pro-
gramme in context was based on a widely accepted
methodological standard in information systems
research.19 However, this standard is not accepted by
some healthcare information systems researchers, who
define robustness in terms of experimental or quasi-
experimental studies of the “deployment” of a technol-
ogy and its “impact” on predefined outcomes.41 The
profound epistemological differences and lack of dia-
logue between healthcare information systems
research (led largely by doctors with an interest in
information technology) and mainstream information
systems research (led by interdisciplinary teams of
organisational sociologists, computer scientists, and
political scientists) have been highlighted
previously.40 42 The findings reported here will not
resolve these differences butmay promote a long over-
due debate on the applicability of the epidemiological
hierarchy of evidence to studies of complex change in
health care.
Box 3: The socio-technical network for the summary care record programme
Five interacting sub-networks were evident:
1. The design network
 Policy makers
 Professional advisers
 Software developers (based variously in Connecting for Health, commercial IT
companies, and academic institutions)
 A large, complex, and evolving technical infrastructure
2. The implementation network
 Civil servants
 National and local managers
 Clinical leads
 Suppliers
 Trainers
 Frontline NHS staff
 Individuals and groups who sought to “resist” implementation in different sectors
 Patient organisations and other groups who encouraged implementation from the user
perspective
3. The governance network
 Professional, legal, and regulatory bodies (such as the Information Commission)
 Technical security features and the Connecting for Health staff who designed and built
them
 Security testing contractors
 Business processes, tools, and systems that supported information governance
activity
 Individuals such as Caldicott Guardians and privacy officers
4. The frontline user network
 NHS clinicians
 Local administrators and call handlers
 “Front end” software linking local systems to the SCR infrastructure
 Terminals and smart card readers
 Patients who were consulted on access to their record
5. The evaluation network
 Policy makers and business managers who constructed the “benefits realisation” case
 Teams and systems involved in in-house monitoring
 Official bodies such as the Public Accounts Committee
 Lobbyists (including the press) who made claims and counter claims about the
justification and progress of the programme
 Communications staff and systems within Connecting for Health
 Our own evaluation team and governance structures, including the Connecting for
Health Evaluation Programme
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Examples of apparently successful national pro-
grammes to share records between primary and sec-
ondary care exist in Scotland, New Zealand, and
Denmark.43-50 In Denmark, for example, all the coun-
try’s general practices, hospitals, pharmacies, and
laboratories are linked via a single national network,
and electronic transfer of prescriptions, laboratory
results, letters, and emails is the norm, though (perhaps
significantly) there is no centrally held record. These
national schemes differ in some fundamental technical
features, but all report similar critical success factors: a
pace of progress commensurate with levels of engage-
ment and tension for change; early and frequent dialo-
gue between key stakeholders to develop a culture of
collaboration; systematic attention (such as via focus
groups or discussion networks) to potentially conten-
tious issues; strong peer influence (such as through
clinical user groups); careful alignment of incentives
for both individuals and organisations; transparency
in monitoring and evaluation; and balancing central
and local leadership.These key influences are reflected
in three recent systematic reviews on implementing
electronic record programmes more generally.40 51 52
The scale and scope of the SCR programme inevita-
bly increased its complexity. Because the socio-techni-
cal network is heterogeneous and potentially unstable,
alignments between stakeholders must be actively
built and creatively managed—a task that gets expo-
nentially more difficult as the network gets bigger.53
An industry report on the Danish shared record
scheme recommended focusing on a simple, basic
design and concluded that “increasing the level of com-
plexity does not bring a corresponding increase in
benefits.”50 The three countries whose shared record
systems are the most advanced all have populations
of around 5 million, though it is not known whether
this figure is a critical ceiling or a coincidence.
The findings of this evaluation suggest that large
scale, centrally drivenmodels for innovation in health-
care IT systems are—perhaps inevitably—associated
with multiple competing perspectives, complex inter-
dependencies, inherent tensions, and high implemen-
tation workload. Information system development is
sometimes depicted in terms of a tension between the
“cathedral” model (large scale, top down, highly stan-
dardised) and the “bazaar” model (organic, laissez-
faire, bottom up).54 The former are more readily stan-
dardised and controlled but are typically complex,
expensive to implement, and inflexible. The latter
risk inconsistent quality control and limited inter-
operability. A third option, “middle out”—whose
defining feature is collaboration between government,
industry, and clinicians to create an evolving set of
standards and promote dialogue across sectors—has
been proposed as a potential way forward for the
National Programme for IT.54 Such an approach
would require a fundamentally different change
model and changes to the nature of relationships
between the state, commercial suppliers, clinicians,
and service users, but could potentially build fruitfully
on work done in the SCR programme to date.
This evaluation would not have been possible without the cooperation of
a number of people and organisations. Patients and staff in the various
field sites allowed us access to their work and experiences, gave freely of
their time, and engaged with our desire to gain an honest, richly informed
account of events. Adastra provided a large quantitative dataset and
background information which allowed us to undertake an independent
analysis. The evaluation benefited from the Summary Care Record
Independent Evaluation (SCRIE) External Advisory Group, chaired by lay
member Jenni Bowley, which served as a diverse, critical, and questioning
audience for our emerging findings. Members (listed in full elsewhere14)
included representatives from patient groups, academic institutions,
professional organisations, and Connecting for Health. The study was
part of the Connecting for Health Evaluation Programme coordinated by
Richard Lilford’s team at the University of Birmingham. Academic
colleagues too numerous to list provided feedback and guidance
throughout the study.
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